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CRIMINAL LAW
Heath v. Alabama: A Case Study of Doctrine
and Rationality in the Supreme Court
RONALD J. ALLEN*
JOHN P. RATNASWAMY**
One of the most serious complaints that can be directed at the
Supreme Court of the United States is that the Court has confused
mechanistic application of verbal formulations of doctrine with ra-
tional consideration of the reasons that gave rise to those formula-
tions. The Court, as it reminds us often enough, does not sit as a
court of errors.' It sits to decide matters of national significance,
and thus it continually addresses questions and arguments of policy.
Consequently, the Court has substantial experience in distinguish-
ing the arid rules that emerge from a common law process from the
live reasons, policies, and concerns that give rise to those rules and
from which their meaning should be derived. In addition, the Court
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. J.D., University of
Michigan, 1973; B.S., Marshall University, 1970. Professor Allen was counsel for Mr.
Heath before the Supreme Court of the United States and is presently consulting with
Mr. Heath's counsel in Alabama post-conviction relief proceedings.
** J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 1985; M.A., B.S., Northwestern Uni-
versity, 1982. While Mr. Ratnaswamy was Professor Allen's research assistant he as-
sisted in the preparation of petitioner's pleadings in Heath.
1 "For many years the Court and the justices have admonished the bar and the pub-
lic that the Supreme Court 'is not, and never has been, primarily concerned with the
correction of errors in lower court decisions.' " Gressman, Much Ado About Certiorari, 52
GEo. LJ. 742, 755 (1964) (quoting ChiefJustice Vinson's address to the American Bar
Association on September 7, 1949). In 1979 all nine Justices of the Court endorsed a
bill to reduce its obligatory appeal jurisdiction in a letter to Congress that stated in part:
"[At present] the Court is required to devote time and other finite resources to deciding
on the merits cases which do not, in ChiefJustice Taft's words, 'involve principles, the
application of which are of wide public importance or governmental interest, and which
should be authoritatively declared by the final court.'" G. GUNTHER, CONSTIrrToNAL
LAw 62-63 (10th ed. 1980). See also Harlan, Manning the Dikes, 13 REC. A.B. CrrY N.Y.
541 (1958); HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 67TH CONG.,
2D SESS. SER. 33, AT 2 (1922) (TESTMONY OF CHIEFJUSTICE TAFT); Sup. CT. R. 17 ("Con-
siderations governing review on certiorari").
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typically has the benefit of hearing issues after they have been con-
sidered by numerous lower courts that, through their opinions and
decisions, have advanced understanding of the relevant problems.
Nor are these the extent of the Supreme Court's resources.
Presumably the Court has presented to it a higher than average level
of advocacy in which skilled attorneys probe the background of the
relevant and generally competing rules of law in order to convince
the Court that one perspective upon those rules is superior to any
other.2 Obviously, this is a process that relies on elucidation of the
meaning and source of the relevant rules, not just upon their verbal
formulations. Moreover, the Court has its clerks, individuals who
have distinguished themselves by their legal abilities in superb law
schools and who have the time and skills to rectify failings in re-
search or preparation of the advocates. Perhaps even more impor-
tantly, the Supreme Court has no deadlines. It determines when it
is ready to decide a case, and thus can study a problem until the
members of the Court are satisfied that the matter is understood. 3
Superimposed over all the resources that the Court possesses
to assist its decision-making process is the fact that the Court makes
clear that it is aware of the distinction between doctrine and ration-
ale. It does so in its numerous opinions on the role of stare decisis
in constitutional adjudication, 4 which necessarily distinguish be-
tween acceptance of a prior decision's holding and full deliberation
over what rule should govern a case. The Court also demonstrates
its cognizance of the significance of reasoned justification in the
even more numerous opinions in which it relates its conclusions to
acceptable premises in an orderly fashion that can only be the result
of an effort to provide a coherent rationale for the conclusions that
it draws. 5 Indeed, many dissenting and concurring opinions are
2 Perhaps the failing in Mr. Heath's case was the inadequacy of his counsel. That is
for others to judge, but such a conclusion would in some ways be more comforting than
the thesis of this article, which is that the Court's decision in Heath was the result of an
abdication of legitimate decision-making methodologies.
3 Although the caseload of the Court has increased significantly in recent decades,
the number of cases disposed of by full opinion has not varied greatly. G. GuNTHER,
CONSTrrurIONAL LAw 72 (10th ed. 1980).
4 See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 106 S. Ct. 617, 624-25 (1986); Miller v. Fenton, 106 S.
Ct. 445, 449-53 (1985); Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2311 (1984); Arkansas Elec.
Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm., 461 U.S. 375, 390-93 (1983); Thurston
Motor Lines v. Rand, 460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824
(1982); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-72 (1974); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382
U.S. 111, 116 (1965); Swift v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1941).
5 The nation's highest appellate court would have no reason to write or publish
opinions were it not seeking to explain its decisions. By stating reasons for its rulings,
the Court buttresses the authority of its orders and more broadly that of the Court as an
institution. The Court's clarification or pronunciation of the law also may make evident
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written in which the primary issue is the majority's, or some member
of the Court's, "understanding" of a rule's rationale.6 This "under-
standing" is of importance, of course, only if rules are based on rea-
sons, and those reasons determine the meaning and scope of the
rules. The work product of the Court for the most part reflects a
belief that both of these propositions are true.
For the most part, but not always. On occasion the Supreme
Court renders decisions that are surprisingly insensitive to the need
for a reasoned justification of the Court's conclusions. Almost inva-
riably the results in such cases are highly problematic, which recon-
firms the crucial role of reasoned outcomes in constitutional
adjudication. Opinions lacking any evident analytical foundation
are significant reminders that being last does not ensure being
right-a healthy thing to remember in a constitutional democracy
that may tend to view the Court with too much rather than too little
reverence-thus substantiating the value of all questions always be-
ing open in constitutional adjudication. 7 These cases also play an
important role in investigations into the nature of the judicial func-
tion by providing valuable evidence of how different processes of
judicial decision-making may affect the results in cases. The infor-
mation that emerges from such an inquiry is of great consequence
to a common law system of decision, especially to one that invests its
courts with the power of judicial review. Such cases also need to be
the need for new legislation or constitutional amendment. Perhaps most importantly,
the common law process could not function effectively without the Court's promulga-
tion of its opinions; judgments or even recitations of holdings absent explication of their
underpinnings would provide little or no guidance to lower courts in applying those
rulings to anything other than identical factual situations, and possibly not even to those
if the facts of the cases before the Court were not made clear. The importance of rea-
soned opinions is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the Supreme Court itself places
considerably less precedential weight on summary dispositions, Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 390 n.9 (1979); Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1976); Edelman
v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974); and on opinions which do not treat a particular
argument before the Court or which dispose of it sub silentio; Penhurst State School v.
Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 917-19 (1984); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71
(1974).
6 Examples from the Court's current term include: Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct.
668 (1986) (the dissenters contested the majority's understanding of the scope of the
interests protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); United
States v. Loud Hawk, 106 S. Ct. 648 (1986)(the dissenters disputed the majority's view
of the interests served by the speedy trial clause of the sixth amendment); Maine v.
Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477 (1985)(the dissenters challenged the majority's understanding
of the rationales of the sixth amendment's right to counsel provision and the exclusion-
ary rule); Green v. Mansour, 106 S. Ct. 422 (1985)(the dissenters disagreed with the
majority's view of the rationale of the eleventh amendment).
7 Constitutional questions can never be finally settled because the rule of stare deisis
is not absolute. See cases cited supra note 4.
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studied to determine whether there is any justification for the
Court's conclusions, despite the Court's failure to consider or artic-
ulate it.
We will engage in just such a case study in this Article, focusing
on the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Heath v. Alabama,8 in
which the Court held that the double jeopardy prohibition does not
bar different states from bringing successive prosecutions of the
same individual for the same crime. First, we examine the factual
background of the case and summarize the three main contentions
of the Court's majority opinion.9 We then discuss the history of the
double jeopardy prohibition1 ° and its "dual sovereignty" excep-
tion. 1 In light of that background, we evaluate the validity of the
majority's arguments in Heath.12 This analysis reveals that Heath is
an example of simplistic application of doctrine unresponsive to the
reasons that gave rise to the rules the Court purports to apply. The
relevant considerations in Heath point unmistakably to a different
outcome than that which was reached by the Court, and there are no
countervailing justifications for its holding. By establishing these
propositions, we will attempt to show that Heath is little more than a
"derelict on the waters of the law"' 3 and that its impact on the de-
velopment of the law should be primarily as an example of poor
judicial craftsmanship. This may be little solace for those unfortu-
nate souls caught within the wake of this particular derelict, but the
demonstration may help reduce the incidence of such cases in the
future by bringing attention once more to the relative roles of rules
and reason in constitutional adjudication. Following our analysis of
the Court's opinion, we develop the approach we believe the Court
could, and should, have taken.' 4 Finally, we briefly discuss some of
the likely consequences of the Court's ruling in Heath.15
I. THE FACTS AND OPINION IN HEATH
On August 31, 1981, the body of Rebecca Heath, a resident of
Alabama, was discovered in Georgia.' 6 The cause of death was a
gunshot wound to the head.17 Suspicion immediately centered on
8 106 S. Ct. 433 (1985).
9 See infra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 32-61 and accompanying text.
11 See infra 62-81 and accompanying text.
12 See infra 82-125 and accompanying text.
13 Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 232 (1957)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
14 See infra notes 126-42 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.




Mrs. Heath's husband, Larry Heath, who eventually confessed and
pleaded guilty to a Georgia indictment for planning his wife's mur-
der.18 Heath was sentenced to life imprisonment for his crime.19
Approximately seven months after his confession and ten weeks af-
ter having been sentenced to life imprisonment, Heath was called to
testify at the trial of his alleged confederates in Georgia. 20 Upon
being called to the stand, Heath refused to testify on the ground
that he might be subject to a kidnapping charge in Alabama, and
thus had a right not to incriminate himself under the fifth amend-
ment as incorporated by the fourteenth amendment. One week af-
ter Heath exercised the privilege against self-incrimination in
Georgia he was indicted by a grand jury in Alabama, but not for
kidnapping; rather, he was indicted for the same murder for which
he already had been convicted and sentenced in Georgia. 2'
Heath subsequently was tried in Alabama, convicted, and sen-
tenced to die.22 On appeal, he argued that his trial and sentence
violated the double jeopardy prohibition because he was twice con-
victed and sentenced for the murder of the same individual. 23 The
State defended its actions on the grounds that the "dual sover-
eignty" exception to the double jeopardy prohibition should apply
to successive state prosecutions, as it does to separate prosecutions
by a state and the federal government24 and to separate prosecu-
tions by the federal government and an Indian tribe.2 5
The Supreme Court, with Justice O'Connor writing for the ma-
jority, affirmed the conviction and sentence of death in an opinion
that purports to be an easy application of the settled dual sover-
eignty exception. The Court concluded that: "The dual sover-
eignty doctrine, as originally articulated and consistently applied by
this Court, compels the conclusion that successive state prosecu-
18 Id.
19 Id
20 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Heath.
21 Petitioner was indicted for "murder during a kidnapping." Ala. Code § 13A-5-
40(a)(1) (1982). Respondent did not deny petitioner's contention that the Georgia and
Alabama offenses were the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Heath, 106 S. Ct.
at 437.
22 106 S. Ct. at 436.
23 In the lower courts, his former counsel also raised the question of Alabama's juris-
diction over those events that had occurred in Georgia. His counsel failed to raise the
jurisdictional question before the Alabama Supreme Court. As a result, the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to consider the jurisdictional question. 106 S. Ct. at 436-37.
This issue, and others, now are pending in state post-conviction relief proceedings.
24 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, reh'g denied, 360 U.S. 907 (1959); Abbate v. United
States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
25 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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tions by two States for the same conduct are not barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause." 26
The discussion in Heath has three major contentions, each of
which upon more careful inquiry than that presented by the Court
turns out to be insufficient to support its holding. The Supreme
Court first asserted that the "dual sovereignty doctrine is founded
on the common law conception of crime as an offense against the
sovereignty of the government. When a defendant in a single act
violates the 'peace and dignity' of two sovereigns by breaking the
laws of each, he has committed two distinct 'offences.' "27 Thus, in
the Court's view, "the crucial determination is whether the two enti-
ties that seek successively to prosecute a defendant for the same
course of conduct can be termed separate sovereigns." 28 According
to the Court, states are separate sovereigns for this purpose; thus
this test was satisfied. 29
The Court's second major contention was that it would be un-
seemly to require states to compete with each other in the enforce-
ment of their respective laws: "To deny a State its power to enforce
its criminal laws because another State has won the race to the
courthouse 'would be a shocking and untoward deprivation of the
historic right and obligation of the States to maintain peace and or-
der within their confines.' "30 Finally, the Court asserted that each
State has separate interests in the enforcement of its own laws which
"by definition can never be satisfied by another State's enforcement
of its own laws." 3 1 Thus, each state is justified a prior in prosecuting
an individual for an offense no matter how many prosecutions al-
ready have been brought for the same conduct in the courts of other
governments.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
An examination of the history of the double jeopardy prohibi-
tion reveals that a limitation of the principle to successive prosecu-
tions brought by a particular prosecuting authority is not supported
by the available historical evidence. Rather, the bar on multiple tri-
als and punishments for the same conduct has been founded upon
individual interests that are implicated by repeated criminal pro-
ceedings, regardless of the identity of the prosecuting authority.
26 Heath, 106 S. Ct. at 437.
27 Id. (citing United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 438-39.
30 Id. at 440 (quoting Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 137).
31 Id. (emphasis supplied).
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Although many of the principles underlying the Bill of Rights
originated in the law of England, particularly in the common law,
the origins of the prohibition of double jeopardy are much older:
"Of all procedural guarantees in the Bill of Rights, the principle of
double jeopardy is the most ancient. It is 'one of the oldest ideas
found in western civilization,' with roots in Greek, Roman, and ca-
non law." 32 In Roman law, criminal prosecutions were brought not
by the state but rather by aggrieved citizens. 33 The principle of
double jeopardy therefore was formulated in the Digest ofJustinian as
the precept that" 'the governor should not permit the same person
to be again accused of a crime of which he had been acquitted.' "34
Thus, at its inception the prohibition of double jeopardy was not
formulated in terms of who brought charges, but rather barred an
individual from being subjected to repeated accusations of the same
crime under any circumstances.
Canon law, which began its development at the close of the Ro-
man empire,35 grew to accept the maxim "Nemo bis in idipsum-no
man ought to be punished twice for the same offense." 36 In the
twelfth century a major element of the conflict between Thomas
Becket and Henry II was the king's desire to have clerics who had
been convicted in ecclesiastical courts turned over to civil tribunals
for further prosecution. 37 Henry conceded the point in 1176 fol-
lowing Becket's martyrdom. 38 The king's concession is significant
because the royal and ecclesiastical courts obviously did not 'draw
their power from the same sovereign. The application of the double
jeopardy bar to successive religious and secular prosecutions dem-
onstrates that the focus of the prohibition was the defendant, not
the prosecutor.
The foundations of the modern understanding of double jeop-
ardy began to emerge in the seventeenth century.39 Sir Edmund
Coke's Second Institutes propounded the double jeopardy prohibition
32 Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of DoubleJeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 81
(1978)(footnotes omitted).
33 J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 2
(1969).
34 Id.
35 Id at 3.
36 M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 5 (1969).
37 For somewhat different descriptions of the controversy, compare M. FRIEDLAND,
supra note 36, at 5, with J. SIGLER, supra note 33, at 3.
38 M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 36, at 5.
39 "The last half of the seventeenth century was a period of increasing consciousness
of the importance of doublejeopardy. Perhaps this was due partly to the writing of Lord
Coke and partly as a reaction against the lawlessness in the first half of the century." Id.
at 11 (footnote omitted). See id. at 11-14 (for further discussion of this point).
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as a basic maxim of the common law.40 Coke recognized the pres-
ent double jeopardy categories of autrefois acquit (former acquittal),
autrefois convict (former conviction) and former pardon, and,
although he seems to have used the term "jeopardy" to refer to the
possibility of capital punishment, "[buy the time the First Institute was
completed, the double jeopardy doctrine was clearly defined as... a
protection against the state even for relatively minor offenses." 41
Sir William Blackstone, who wrote one hundred years after Coke,
began to use the word "jeopardy" with more frequency to describe
the doctrine itself, and he rested his rules of autrefois convict and au-
trefois acquit upon a single principle of common law.42 Blackstone
described the doctrine of double jeopardy as limited to government
prosecutions alone. 43
Coke and Blackstone had a profound influence on American
understanding of the common law,44 but to a certain extent early
development of double jeopardy law in America took its own path.
The civil courts of Massachusetts were forbidden to sentence a de-
fendant twice for the same offense by the Body of Liberties of 1641,
which was composed at the direction of the governor and the gen-
eral court.45 The laws of Massachusetts influenced the development
of the laws of many other colonies,46 and their emphasis on the pro-
hibition of double jeopardy probably contributed to its eventual in-
clusion in the Bill of Rights. 47 A number of the early post-
Revolutionary state constitutions did not bar double jeopardy,48
however, but this is most likely attributable to the fact that the plea
was generally recognized by statute or at common law.49 During
this period, American law generally followed earlier English devel-
opments by extending double jeopardy principles to non-capital
40 J. SIGLER, supra note 33, at 16-19.
41 Id. at 19. See id. at 18-19 (for further discussion).
42 Id. at 20.
43 Id. In England, the Roman practice of prosecution of criminal suits by private par-
ties still was employed occasionally as late as the eighteenth century; it was banned by
statute in 1819. M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 36, at 8-9. Blackstone further limited the
doctrine of double jeopardy to felony cases alone, and required an actual prior verdict of
guilt or innocence for the doctrine's application; both requirements have been rejected
in American law. J. SIGLER, supra note 33, at 20.
44 J. SIGLER, supra note 33 at 16-19.
45 The Body of Liberties was "less a code of existing law than it was a compilation of
constitutional provisions." G. HAsKINS, LAW AND AuTHORrrY IN EARLY MASSACHUSE'rs
129 (1960).
46 J. SIGLER, supra note 33, at 22.
47 Id. at 22-23.
48 Id. at 23.




During the ratification process for the Constitution the demand
for a bill of rights grew, and among the amendments proposed was
that there should be "no second trial after acquittal." 51 After the
Constitution was ratified, James Madison proposed various amend-
ments in the House of Representatives, including the provision that:
"No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to
more than one punishment or trial for the same offense."5 2 The
House rejected the amendment and other proposed formulations of
the prohibition, including one which added the phrase "by any law
of the United States" after the words "same offense." 53 The rejec-
tion of the latter amendment permits "the speculation by negative
inference that the double jeopardy clause may have been intended
to apply to the states and the federal government alike."' 54 At the
least, its rejection suggests that federal courts were not to try an
individual for a crime for which that individual already had been
prosecuted by another sovereign.55
While the House was deliberating, the Senate adopted a pro-
posed amendment providing that "no person shall be subject, ex-
cept in cases of impeachment to more than one trial, or be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb by any public prosecution." 56 This for-
mulation indicates a sensitivity on the part of the first Congress to
the individual interests at stake in successive prosecutions by differ-
ent governments. In conference committee the present form of the
Bill of Rights was drafted, which Congress then approved for sub-
mission to the states. 57 There was little debate on the floor of the
50 Id at 19, 23-24.
51 J. ELLIOTr, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTrnTrON (1836). See also J. SIGLER, supra note 33, at 28, 32.
52 j. SIGLER, supra note 33, at 28 (footnote omitted).
53 Id. at 30.
54 Id (footnote omitted). See State v. Moor, I Miss. 134 (Miss. 1823). Cf Phillips v.
McCauley, 92 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1937)(where the court apparently rejected this conclu-
sion). In Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), the Court stated
that the first eight amendments were inapplicable to the states.
55 See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820)(discussing when pros-
ecution by another nation of a crime in international waters will bar criminal proceed-
ings in federal courts). The history of double jeopardy principles in international law
and in the domestic law of other nations casts even further doubt upon the dual sover-
eignty theory. For a discussion of the prosecution of the same acts and defendant by
more than one nation, see M. Friedland, supra note 36 at 357-403; J. SIGLER, supra note
33, at 118-54; Grant, Successive Prosecution by State and Nation: Common Law and British
Empire Comparisons, 4 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1956); Comment, Federalism v. Double Jeopardy: a
Comparative Analysis of Successive Prosecutions in the United States, Canada, and Australia, 5 CAL.
W. INT'L LJ. 399 (1975).
56 J. SIGLER, supra note 33, at 31 (footnote omitted).
57 Id. at 31-32. The fact that the Senate's formulation of the double jeopardy prohi-
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Congress as to the meaning of the double jeopardy clause.58 How-
ever, what debate did occur indicates that it was the intention of the
framers to implement their understanding of the common law of
Great Britain and the former colonies.59 The available evidence
suggests that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights, the common law was understood to apply the double
jeopardy bar to successive prosecutions by different sovereigns. 60
This provides additional evidence that the dual sovereignty theory
lacks any historical foundation, and that the double jeopardy prohi-
bition was intended to protect the individual from repeatedly being
subjected to criminal proceedings arising out of the same charges,
no matter who the prosecuting authority is.61
III. THE HISTORY OF THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY EXCEPrION
In the middle of the nineteenth century the conception of the
double jeopardy clause as prohibiting successive prosecutions by
any prosecuting authority was questioned by dicta in a series of three
cases. 62 These cases were not motivated by mystical conceptions of
"sovereignty;" instead, they were motivated by concerns about the
bition was rejected might be considered an argument in favor of the dual sovereignty
theory. However, that would only be so if it is assumed that by the words "the same
offense" in the prohibition as adopted only the laws of the federal government are in-
cluded; that assumption begs the question of the meaning of the double jeopardy
prohibition.
58 I ANNALS OF CONG. 753 (J. Gales ed. 1789). The only issue seriously discussed was
the concern that the clause not bar appeals by convicted defendants and retrials where
those appeals succeeded if appropriate. Id.
59 Id.
60 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, reh'g denied, 360 U.S. 907 (1959); Bartkus, 359
U.S. at 156 n.15 (Black, J., dissenting); Brief for Petitioner at 38-39, Bartus; Grant, supra
note 55, at 8-11. But see Comment, Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereigns, 35 IND. L.J. 444,
444-54 (1960). Justice Frankfurter found the English precedents "dubious." Bartkus,
359 U.S. at 128 n.9. However, it appears that at the time our Constitution was framed
these cases were understood, rightly or wrongly, as rejecting the dual sovereignty the-
ory. Furthermore, these cases apparently were not even brought to the attention of the
Court until the Bartkus and Abbate cases. See Grant, supra note 55, at 35. Hence, the
Court's reliance in Bartkus and Abbate on its own precedents is highly problematic.
61 There is certainly no evidence that the states intended to preserve unto themselves
any right of successive prosecution. Such prosecutions probably were not considered
possible because the common law greatly restricted the territorial scope of state criminal
jurisdiction. See infra notes 65, 144. Of course, if the Supreme Court at some point
determines that states may not exercise extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction, the same
result would probably be reached in a case like Heath on jurisdictional grounds that
should have obtained on double jeopardy grounds.
62 The cases discussed in the text were foreshadowed by two cases decided in 1820.
Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820)(discussing federal supremacy); United
States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820)(discussing when foreign prosecution of
a crime on the high seas will bar prosecution in the United States).
[Vol. 76810
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different roles of the two levels of American government and by a
growing realization that something had to be done to prevent con-
flict between the states and the national government. Those consid-
erations led to the discussion in these cases of a dual sovereignty
exception to the double jeopardy clause, and it is those concerns,
along with the individual interests protected by the clause, that
should control the scope of any such exception.
In Fox v. Ohio,63 the Supreme Court reviewed an Ohio convic-
tion for passing counterfeit coin.64 The defendant's primary con-
tention was that the Constitution's explicit grant of power to
Congress to punish counterfeiting preempted the Ohio law,65 but
he also argued that the possibility of double prosecution cast doubt
on his conviction. 66 The Supreme Court affirmed, apparently on
the theory that the Congressional power was limited to punishing
the act of producing counterfeit money and did not reach the pass-
ing of false coinage. 67 This conclusion temporarily mitigated any
doublejeopardy concerns. Three years later, however, the Supreme
Court sustained a federal conviction for the uttering of false coinage
63 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
64 d at 432.
65 Id. at 424. The defendant relied upon U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. In support of the
prosecution, the Attorney General of Ohio argued that prosecution by two states of the
same crime was impossible because only one state could possess territorial jurisdiction
over a particular crime, but that no such limit barred prosecution by the federal govern-
ment and a state of the same defendant and conduct. Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410,
419 (1847).
66 Fox, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 428.
67 Id. at 433-34. The Court stated that even if duplicate prosecutions were possible,
the states were not subject to the fifth amendment, and that in any event:
It is almost certain, that, in the benignant spirit in which the institutions both of the
State and federal systems are administered, an offender who should have suffered
the penalties denounced by the one would not be subjected a second time to pun-
ishment by the other for acts essentially the same, unless indeed, this might occur in
instances of peculiar enormity, or where the public safety demanded extraordinary
rigor.
Id. at 435. It is unclear what assumption the Court made about the likelihood of a sec-
ond prosecution following an acquittal.
Justice McLean, the sole dissenter in Fox v. Ohio, vigorously argued that prosecu-
tions by both the federal and state government "would be a mockery ofjustice and a
reproach to civilization. It would bring our system of government into merited con-
tempt." Id at 440. He argued that:
To punish the same act by the two governments would violate, not only the com-
mon principles of humanity, but would be repugnant to the nature of both govern-
ments.... There is no principle better established by the common law, none more
fully recognized in the federal and State constitutions, than that an individual shall
not be put in jeopardy twice for the same offence. This, it is true, applies to the
respective governments; but its spirit applies with equal force against a double pun-
ishment, for the same act, by a State and the federal government.
Id. at 439.
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in United States v. Marigold.68 Although the possibility of double
prosecution for this crime was now apparent, counsel for the de-
fendant did not argue that this possibility raised any question as to
the validity of the federal prosecution. 69 The Court simply held that
the federal statute and prosecution were within the federal govern-
ment's constitutional powers. 70
Two years later in Moore v. Illinois,71 the Court for the first time
directly discussed the problem of duplicate state and federal prose-
cutions for the same crime. Moore was convicted under an Illinois
statute proscribing the harboring or secreting of fugitive slaves.72
Moore's principal argument was preemption of the state law by the
federal Fugitive Slave Act, but he also objected to the possible
double jeopardy problem of prosecution under both the state and
federal statutes.73 The Supreme Court found that the Illinois and
federal statutes were dissimilar in their essential underlying pur-
pose, in their definition of the offense, and in the nature of the pun-
ishment which they authorized. 74 The purpose of the federal
government was protection of the property interests of slave own-
ers, while the state's goal was to bar black persons, whether slave or
free, from the state's territory. 75 Despite these differences, the
Court nevertheless proceeded to articulate for the first time the dual
sovereignty theory:
An offence, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a
law.... Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or
territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns. And
may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either.
The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws of
both .... That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an
68 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850).
69 See id. at 562-65. Counsel for defendant's "utter neglect of the subject may aptly
be characterized as sheer folly." L. MILLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
25 (1968). The Court's only statement reflecting recognition of this question was:
With the view of avoiding conflict between the State and Federal jurisdictions, this
court in the case of Fox v. The State of Ohio have taken care to point out, that the same
act might, as to its character and tendencies, and the consequences it involved, con-
stitute an offence against both the State and Federal governments, and might draw
to its commission the penalties denounced by either, as appropriate to its character
in reference to each. We think this distinction sound, as we hold to be the entire
doctrines laid down in the case above mentioned, and regard them as being in no
wise in conflict with the conclusions adopted in the present case.
United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) at 569.
70 Id. at 567.
71 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
72 Id. at 17.
73 The reporter's notes of counsel's arguments do not include this point, but there is
reference in the opinion to the argument having been made. Id. at 16.




offender, cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly averred that the
offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that
by one act he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly
punishable. He could not plead the punishment by one in bar to a
conviction by the other .... 76
The decision was an inevitable consequence of its historical
context. In Moore, the Court was asked to strike down a type of state
statute that was at the heart of a dispute over the scope of states'
rights, a dispute so serious that it would lead to the Civil War. The
Court was being asked to do so not only where the laws of neither
"sovereign" impinged upon the legitimate interests of the other,
but where the Court was beginning to realize that state and federal
criminal statutes were going to overlap and intersect in unpredict-
able ways. Moreover, none of the alternatives available to the Court
were feasible, except for the creation of a dual sovereignty excep-
tion to the double jeopardy prohibition.
The Court might have required the states to demonstrate in
each case where there was a substantial risk of dual prosecutions
that the interests served by state prosecution were sufficiently differ-
ent from those that would be served by federal prosecution to justify
the risk, a position later adopted by the United States both in its
brief and oral argument in Abbate77 and essentially in its Petite pol-
icy.78 It is clear why the Supreme Court did not adopt this approach
in Moore. To require such a showing would have been an affront to
the very dignity of the states that was at the heart of the tumultuous
political controversy the nation was then undergoing, and also
would have seriously impinged upon local control of law
enforcement.
Alternatively, the Court could have concluded that state prose-
cution precluded subsequent federal prosecution of the same acts or
crimes, but to so hold would have resulted in a significant infringe-
ment upon federal supremacy, as would a requirement that the fed-
eral government demonstrate a separate interest justifying a second
76 Id. at 19-20 (footnotes omitted).
77 See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 196 (1959)(Brennan, J., separate
opinion).
78 The Petite policy basically bars federal prosecution of an individual already sub-
jected to state prosecution where both prosecutions arise out of the same acts unless a
compelling federal interest would be served by the second prosecution. The policy is
named after Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960), where the Court granted the
Justice Department's motion to vacate a federal conviction and remand the case for dis-
missal where a prior state conviction involving the same acts already had been obtained.
The current statement of the policy may be found in United States Attorney's Manual
Sec. 9-2.142 (July 1, 1985).
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prosecution.79 Instead of taking these unattractive paths, the Court
formulated the dual sovereignty exception, thus providing a means
of accommodating the competing interests of the state and national
governments 80 a reconciliation perhaps made all the happier be-
cause it was dicta in each of the three cases. 8'
"Dual sovereignty," in short, arose as an exception to the nor-
mal rules of double jeopardy for certain fundamental reasons re-
lated to the structure of American government. Unless there is
some other justification for the theory, it should apply only where
the reasons which gave rise to it are present: where two governmen-
tal entities pursuing quite diverse interests share substantially over-
lapping territorial jurisdictions, where there is a substantial risk of
interference by one governmental entity in the affairs of another,
and where multiple prosecutions are necessary for the satisfaction of
the legitimate purposes of each governmental unit. The Court in
Heath virtually ignored these considerations, and the arguments the
Court did advance are inadequate to justify its conclusion.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S ARGUMENTS
A. "SOVEREIGNTY" AS THE BASIS OF THE DECISION IN HEATH
The Court's assertion that the original articulation of the dual
sovereignty doctrine compels its holding in Heath suffers from two
difficulties. First, the dual sovereignty doctrine does not exist in-
dependent of the double jeopardy clause; rather, the doctrine is de-
rivative of it.82 Thus, the first issue in evaluating the doctrine's
79 The government's voluntary adoption and discretionary application of such a pol-
icy poses no such threat. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
80 See L. MILLER, supra note 69, at 33 ("The Court wanted to chart a sane course
between... eroding national supremacy and... denigrating the law enforcing responsi-
bilities of the states"); Harrison, Federalism and Double Jeopardy: A Study in the Frustration of
Human Rights, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 306, 313 (1963).
81 No "dual sovereignty" case involved two actual prosecutions until United States v.
Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). Lanza involved the unique circumstance of the explicit
"concurrent" power of the federal government and the states under the eighteenth
amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed). It was not until 1959 that the Court
upheld a second prosecution outside that context. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, reh 'g
denied, 360 U.S. 907 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959). Both these
cases preceded the incorporation of the double jeopardy prohibition into the fourteenth
amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Doubt about the continuing
vitality of the dual sovereignty theory also has been created by Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960) and Murphy v. Waterfront Comm., 378 U.S. 52 (1964), where the
Court held that different "sovereigns" were forbidden to act in combination such that
they violated a defendant's rights.
82 See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1978)(prosecutions by two
sovereigns each under its own laws are by definition not for the "same offence"); Moore
v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 19-20 (1852)(same). Of course, it is our contention
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applicability to successive state prosecutions is the meaning of the
double jeopardy prohibition and how it relates to the multiple sov-
ereignties created by the United States Constitution. As we have
demonstrated, the available evidence indicates that the doublejeop-
ardy clause was intended to prohibit a second prosecution for the
same crime, regardless of whether the first prosecution was brought
by the same or some other government. That historical evidence
also leads to the second problem with the Court's contention. The
dual sovereignty doctrine arose as a grudging exception to normal
double jeopardy principles designed to reduce developing tensions
in the federal structure resulting from the differing, and on occasion
conflicting, interests of states and the national government. None
of the conditions that gave rise to the exception apply to the situa-
tion of successive state prosecutions.
First, and most obviously, states do not share concurrent terri-
torial jurisdiction.83 Thus, the likelihood that states will come into
conflict with each other is much less than is the case in federal/state
relations. Moreover, the possibility of that conflict resulting in the
nullification of one jurisdiction's laws, as was occurring during Pro-
hibition,8 4 is a virtual impossibility because the lack of concurrent
territorial jurisdiction means that acts that violate the law of more
than one state will be rare. Even in those few instances where a sin-
gle act may violate the laws of two states, nullification of one state's
policies by prosecution in another state is highly unlikely. Prosecu-
tion by one state for a criminal act in that state will virtually always
further, rather than retard, the interests of another state. Unlike the
federal/state context where the relevant governmental entities have
fundamentally different concerns and objectives,8 5 the criminal laws
that a "definitional" approach to constitutional adjudication devoid of analysis of the
reasons underlying constitutional language and doctrine is an improper mode of deci-
sion-making.
83 See infra note 144. Occasionally states share concurrent jurisdiction over a border
river. The Supreme Court has stated in dictum that in such cases only one state may
prosecute an individual for an alleged crime on the boundary. Nielsen v. Oregon, 212
U.S. 315, 320 (1909).
84 L. MILLER, supra note 69, at 42 ("certain localities boasted openly of their antipa-
thy to any kind of legally-compelled abstinence."). Cf. supra note 81 (discussing United
States v. Lanza and the eighteenth amendment).
85 The Supreme Court stated in 1876 that:
The people of the United States resident within any State are subject to two
governments: one State; and the other National, but there need be no conflict be-
tween the two. The powers which one possesses, the other does not.... Together
they make one whole, and furnish the people of the United States with a complete
government, ample for the protection of all their rights at home or abroad. True, it
may sometimes happen that a person is amenable to both jurisdictions for one and
the same act .... This does not, however, necessarily imply that the two govern-
ments possess powers in common, or bring them into conflict with each other.
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of most of the states are highly analogous.
The Heath case is a good example of this similarity. Both Ala-
bama and Georgia penalize murder, and in both states it is a serious
felony with penalties ranging up to death.8 6 There is no evidence
that either state was attempting to subvert the policy of the other to
deter and penalize such acts, no evidence that either state ever has
done so, and no reason to believe that such interference will occur
in the future. Therefore it is difficult to discern any important state
interest of Alabama that needed vindication by a separate prosecu-
tion for a crime already prosecuted in Georgia, and this will almost
always be true in the context of state law enforcement. If in some
remarkable instance this was not the case, the most sensible way to
handle the matter would be through a particularized application of
the "sham prosecution" doctrine 7 or the separate state interests
test,88 rather than through a wholesale and unnecessary reduction in
the protections afforded by the double jeopardy clause.
The Court is therefore wrong in its assertion that: "The dual
sovereignty doctrine, as originally articulated and consistently ap-
plied by this Court, compels the conclusion that successive state
prosecutions by two States for the same conduct are not barred by
the Double Jeopardy Clause."89 The best evidence of the intent of
the framers indicates that the double jeopardy clause was intended
to apply to prosecutions by different sovereigns, and that there was
no exception for separate federal and state prosecutions for the
same act, let alone separate state prosecutions. In addition, the
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 550 (1876). This division of powers is illus-
trated by Abbate. In that case Illinois convicted defendants of conspiring in Illinois to
injure and destroy private property of telephone companies outside the state. Abbate,
359 U.S. at 188. The subsequent federal convictions based upon the same acts were for
conspiracy to destroy communications equipment controlled and operated by the
United States. Id. at 188-89. The state thus sought to protect private property interests,
while the federal government protected means of communication used by its instrumen-
talities. Bartkus is a less convincing example of the different roles of the two levels of
American government. In Bartkus a federal jury acquitted the defendant of robbery of a
federally insured savings and loan association. Barthus, 359 U.S. at 121-22. The state
then convicted the defendant of robbery. Id. at 122. Both governments largely sought
to protect peace and order, although the federal government also was seeking to protect
the federal banking scheme.
86 Ala. Code § 13A-5-45 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101 (1968). These statutes
were in effect at the time of Mr. Heath's alleged crime(s).
87 Although the Supreme Court has never had to rule on the question, it is com-
monly believed that sham acquittals or ridiculously low penalties do not constitute jeop-
ardy. See Barthus, 359 U.S. at 161 (Black, J., dissenting); 21 AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law
§ 257 (1981); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.18 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
88 For a discussion of the separate state interests test see infra notes 126, 138-41 and
accompanying text.
89 Heath, 106 S. Ct. at 437.
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cases structuring the dual sovereignty doctrine did so for compel-
ling reasons that are not implicated in the context of successive state
prosecutions. The Supreme Court has applied a rule in an opinion
devoid of any appreciation for the reasons that led to the rule.
In addition to failing to address the history and policies under-
lying the dual sovereignty exception, the Court did not provide a
coherent argument to support its assertion that states are sovereign
for the purposes of the dual sovereignty exception to the double
jeopardy clause. Again, a closer look at the concepts that underlie
the language and rules that the Court used leads to a conclusion
opposite to that reached by the Court.
In essence, the Court has invoked the implications of a remark-
ably simplistic political theory to support is conclusion. According
to the Court, governmental entities are sovereign when "the ulti-
mate source of the power under which the respective prosecutions
were undertaken" 90 is different in each case. Moreover, according
to the Court, state "powers to undertake criminal prosecutions de-
rive from separate and independent sources of power and authority
originally belonging to them before admission to the Union and
preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment." 9 1 The Court drew
sustenance for this argument from its decision in Wheeler v. United
States,92 where it held that Indian tribes and the federal government
were separate sovereigns for double jeopardy purposes because In-
dian tribes derived their authority to prosecute violations of their
own laws from their "primeval sovereignty" rather than from "a del-
egation to them of federal authority." 93
No matter how one interprets the Court's language, the conclu-
sion of the Court is wrong. The states do not possess any "ultimate
source of power" to prosecute criminal offenses. For example,
nothing would prohibit a constitutional amendment that took from
the states this aspect of their police powers. Thus, whatever the rel-
evant ultimate source of power is, it resides elsewhere than in the
states simpliciter. Perhaps more to the point, no case decided by
the Supreme Court relies on such a power. Each of the dual sover-
eignty cases in which the Court upheld separate state and federal
prosecutions are clearly ones where Congress, if it chose to do so,
could preempt state authority over the acts in question. In fact,
whenever an act violates both federal and state law, presumably
Congress has the power to preempt state authority to prosecute the
90 106 S. Ct. at 438 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978)).
91 Id.
92 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
93 Id. at 328.
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act as a result of federal supremacy. 94
By resting its decision solely on an unelaborated notion of sov-
ereignty, the Court has reified the concept of sovereignty and
treated it as though it had meaning independent of the complex of
issues and relationships that comprise the political structure of this
country. This maneuver is highly problematic; "sovereignty" is a
function or description of the political choice to allocate certain
powers in certain ways, rather than being the reason powers are so
distributed. Through the political process, the citizenry has dele-
gated and forbidden certain powers to both the national and the
state governments, 95 while other powers are exclusively the prov-
ince of one or the other level of government.96 "Sovereignty" in
this country refers to a series of highly complex and interrelated
allocations of power of this sort. For example, states must give def-
erence to other states in certain circumstances, such as when re-
quired by the full faith and credit clause.97 Similarly, states are
forbidden from engaging in many activities that normally are con-
sidered part of the sovereign power. 98 A generalization that states
are or are not sovereign in the abstract is therefore misleading at
best, and in any event is essentially meaningless. 99
The extent of the problematic reliance on "ultimate sources of
power" to define the parameters of sovereignty is most evident in
the Court's use of Wheeler. The Court in Wheeler did refer to the
Indian tribes' "ultimate source of power," but then proceeded to
point out that congressional authority over the Indian tribes is ple-
nary. 100 In fact, Congress had limited the power of the tribes to
prosecute offenses to those that had a maximum penalty of six
months imprisonment. 10 1 This is a glaring antinomy. Indian tribes
are being offered as an example of an entity that posses an "ultimate
94 U.S. CONST. art. VI. For examples of preemption, see Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350
U.S. 497 (1956); Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220 (1903); In re Lorey, 134 U.S. 372 (1890).
95 U.S. CONST. amends. I-VIII, IX, XIV.
96 See U.S. CONST. art. I, amend. X.
97 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
98 For example, the conduct of foreign affairs is entrusted solely to the national gov-
ernment. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968)(state alien inheritance law barred
because it intruded into foreign affairs, a field entrusted to the President and Congress).
For a classic discussion of American federalism and its allocation of powers, see I A. DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 116-24, 162-79 (Bradley ed. 1945).
99 As is the Court's reliance on the equally uninformative argument that the states
are "different" and that their "history" is not the same as that of the federal govern-
ment. In both cases the question should be why any difference is of significance, but
such matters are simply ignored in the Court's simplistic approach to "sovereignty."




source of power" to try criminal offenses, and thus as a separate
sovereign for doublejeopardy purposes, while at the same time ple-
nary congressional authority is postulated. How it is that the Indian
tribes can possess an "ultimate source of power" and yet Congress
can remove that source at its pleasure is left completely unanswered,
undoubtedly because there is no answer. The phrase "ultimate
source of power" is just attractive but empty rhetoric in this
context.102
What is perhaps most remarkable about this rhetorical exercise
on the part of the Court is that it was completely unnecessary. The
Supreme Court has available to it a much more compelling para-
digm for resolving issues of "sovereignty" than this puzzling reli-
ance on sophomoric political theory. That paradigm is a functional
one. To determine the respective roles of governmental entities,
the underlying interests and relationships involved ought to be ana-
lyzed. Last term the Court engaged in such an analysis in evaluating
the relationship of federal supremacy and the tenth amendment in
102 The Supreme Court in Wheeler noted:
By emphasizing that the Navajo Tribe never lost its sovereign power to try tri-
bal criminals, we do not mean to imply that a tribe which was deprived of that right
by statute or treaty and then regained it by Act of Congress would necessarily be an
arm of the Federal Government. That interesting question is not before us, and we
express no opinion thereon.
435 U.S. at 328 n.28. Thig suggestion of a "light bulb" theory of sovereignty illustrates
the absurdity of the vacuous political metaphysics underlying the dual sovereignty the-
ory as applied in this manner. There are other problems with the Court's political sci-
ence. For example, 37 of the 50 states were admitted to the Union by Act of Congress.
But while the dual sovereignty theory does not apply to the federal government and a
territory, Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937), it is the "universal practice" to
permit newly created states to prosecute crimes committed in the territory before the
state existed. Higgins v. Brown, 1 Okla. Crim. 33, 69, 94 P. 703, 717-18 (Okla. 1908); Ex
Parte Barber, 87 Okla. Crim. 201, 204-10, 196 P.2d 695, 697-700, cert. denied, 335 U.S.
847 (1948). This is yet another situation where the outcome cannot be reconciled with
an analysis of "sovereignty." In Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970), the Court ruled
that Florida could not prosecute an individual for what was assumed to be the same
offense for which he already had been prosecuted in a city court. The Court stated that
cities and states are not considered to be separate sovereign entities. It at 392-93.
However, cities are not necessarily creatures of state government. See, e.g., City of New
Orleans v. Harrison, 257 La. 923, 244 So. 2d 834 (1971)(state may not infringe upon
city's constitutionally created system of traffic courts). Under the Montana Constitution,
the state and cities partake of "shared sovereignty." State er. rel. Swart v. Molitor, 38
Mont. 71, 72-3. 621 P.2d 1100, 1102 (1981). Some cities were created by royal charter
and have continuously exercised "sovereignty." M. GELFAND, A NATiON OF CrrIEs, 4-5
(1975). It is not clear that such cities are distinguishable from Indian tribes based upon
a purely historical sovereignty analysis.
What is clear is that empty generalizations about sovereignty should not determine
the scope of the double jeopardy prohibition, but rather that it should be defined by
fundamental societal and individual interests as reflected in the evolution of the princi-
ple and the "dual sovereignty" exception.
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Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, t03 and the Court has at
least implicitly employed that approach in its dual sovereignty deci-
sions. In Wheeler, for example, fundamentally different institutions
and societal interests were involved. The Court noted these consid-
erations,10 4 and although it rested its holding on its generalizations
about sovereignty, that holding is more comprehensible if under-
stood to be derivative of the Court's concern about regulating the
borderland between two quite different political entities than it is as
expressing some a priori notions of sovereignty. Had the Court pur-
sued a similar approach in Heath, it would have examined the rea-
sons underlying the dual sovereignty cases and determined whether
any of them justified extending an exception to the double jeopardy
prohibition to multiple state prosecutions. For some unexplained
reason, the Supreme Court chose not to engage in such an analysis.
Accordingly, one is left to wonder why in cases like Garcia the Court
approaches its task with a finely honed sense of political reality while
in cases like Heath the Court appears completely oblivious to identi-
cal considerations.
B. THE RACE TO THE COURTHOUSE
The Court did provide one practical argument for its conclu-
sion, although the argument was not developed in any detail. The
argument is that if successive state prosecutions are not allowed, the
result will be an unseemly competition between states in the prose-
cution of offenses. 10 5 However, this may be the weakest argument
advanced by the Court. In those cases prior to Heath where more
than one state had jurisdiction over an individual for the same crimi-
nal activity, there is virtually no evidence of states competing with
one another to be the first to prosecute a particular criminal act
even though prosecution in one state often will bar prosecution for
the same offense in another state. 106 In addition, there is no evi-
dence to suggest that the normal relationship of prosecuting offices
is one of competition rather than cooperation.
Heath seems to be the paradigm case of interstate cooperation.
The Georgia and Alabama officials cooperated closely in the investi-
103 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1016-17, reh'g denied, 105 S. Ct. 2041 (1985). See also Green v.
Mansour, 106 S. Ct. 423 (the Court examined the institutional interests of the states and
the federal government in construing the eleventh amendment).
104 Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 331-32.
105 106 S. Ct. at 440.
106 But see State v. Straw, 626 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981)(Tennessee
court appeared to imply that a prior Massachusetts prosecution was a sham).
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gation of the crime. 107 The prosecuting authorities in each state
clearly were apprised of what was occurring in the other state.
Georgia did not rush precipitously to an indictment, and after the
indictment was filed did not "race" to a trial.'0 8 Nor did Alabama
officials ever show any interest in slowing down the Georgia pro-
ceedings or in requesting extradition of Mr. Heath. Over eight
months passed between the discovery of the body and the demon-
stration of any interest on the part of Alabama in prosecuting Mr.
Heath in its courts. It was only after Heath refused to testify at his
alleged confederates' trial that Alabama began the process leading
to his trial in Alabama.' 09 There is, in short, no reason to think that
Georgia would have refused to extradite Heath had Alabama wished
to prosecute Heath for murder prior to Georgia doing so. Nor is
there any reason to believe that such a spirit of cooperation would
be adversely affected by limiting the two states to a single prosecu-
tion for the one offense of murder.
Thus, there is no evidence in the facts of the Heath case that
justifies the Court's conclusion that the failure to allow separate
prosecutions by two or more states is necessary to avoid competi-
tion among state prosecutorial authorities. Indeed, if a state in cus-
tody of an individual wished to obstruct a prosecution in another
state, all it need do is refuse to extradite that person." 0 Such an
approach is a much more direct way to interfere in another state's
interests, and is not affected by the decision in Heath.
Not only is the decision in Heath an ineffective means to prevent
any feared race to the courthouse, but the application of the dual
sovereignty exception to successive state prosecutions ironically
may foster interference by states in each others' law enforcement
activities. Plea bargaining is a far more problematic matter now that
the parties in one state must take into account that prosecutions
based upon the same alleged acts may follow in one or more other
states. Defense counsel soon will realize that the solution to this
particular dilemma is to bargain for agreements not to extradite the
suspect, which will create tensions between states and disrupt law
107 Trial Record at 361-63, 366-67, 372, 381, 383-85, 386-90 and 398-99, Heath.
108 Mr. Heath was arrested on September 4, 1981, indicted in November, 1981, and
pleaded guilty on February 10, 1982. 106 S. Ct. at 435.
109 On April 28, 1982, Mr. Heath was called to testify at the trial of his supposed
confederates. Joint Appendix at 47-48. He refused to testify. Id Seven days later he
was indicted in Alabama. 106 S. Ct. at 435. This sequence suggests that Alabama prose-
cuted Mr. Heath because he claimed the privilege against self-incrimination.
110 See Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978)(state court has limited authority to
refuse extradition if governor has granted extradition).
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enforcement activity. 1 '
C. THE "DEFINITION" OF STATE INTERESTS
In what is the most telling, and most chilling, passage of the
Court's opinion, the Court indicates that none of what has been dis-
cussed previously matters. States can try individuals for an act that
occurred elsewhere and for which the individual already has been
tried, convicted, and indeed punished, because "[a] State's interest
in vindicating its sovereign authority through enforcement of its
laws by definition can never be satisfied by another State's enforce-
ment of its own laws.""t 2
What matters, apparently, are definitions. That would explain
the Court's otherwise curious opinion. Not reason, nor history, nor
even the structure of federalism or of the Constitution itself matters;
only definitions do. According to this theory, it does not matter that
this country has a tradition that abhors multiple prosecutions for the
same offense.' 13 Nor does it matter that the most convincing histor-
ical reconstruction indicates that the dual sovereignty doctrine was a
grudging concession to the intensifying conflict between state and
federal authority, 114 or that the individual has concerns of the ut-
most importance at stake. 15 Nor does it matter that it seems pecu-
liar to think of one state's interests as extending to prosecuting
murders that occur in other states, and that prior to Alabama's ac-
tions in Heath few states had ever asserted their interests in this
manner.116 All that matters is that a state has arrogated to itself the
"power" to prosecute an individual. Apparently such arrogations
are to be allowed merely because a majority of the Court is willing
to assert something about the definition of "state interests" without
any elaboration whatsoever. To us, this appears to represent virtual
111 There are other pragmatic problems that flow from the Court's decision. The
lower federal courts now will have to work out the implications of the Court's vindictive-
ness cases as applied in the context of multiple state prosecutions. The facts in Heath
provide a good example of the problem. Alabama showed no interest in prosecuting
Heath until after he exercised his privilege not to incriminate himself in Georgia pro-
ceedings against his alleged confederates. Cf United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124 (3d
Cir. 1986)(rejecting a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness based on an allegation that a
federal firearms charge was brought because the defendant failed to cooperate with state
authorities in his pending state firearms prosecution).
112 106 S. Ct. at 440 (emphasis to "by definition" added; emphasis to "its" supplied).
113 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-96 (1969). See supra notes 45-61 and ac-
companying text.
114 See supra notes 62-81 and accompanying text.
115 See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
116 See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
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abdication of legitimate modes of constitutional decision-making." 17
Contrary to the unilluminating assertions of the Court about
the definition of "state interests," there is no valid purpose of the
criminal law which cannot be served by a single prosecution of a
single crime. Deterrence, retribution, the restoration of public con-
fidence and incapacitation do not require more than a single crimi-
nal proceeding to be effectuated. Moreover, the double jeopardy
prohibition does not forbid even the same sovereign from prosecut-
ing an individual for different offenses arising out of a single act or
transaction.' 18 This provides a broad qualification of the injunction
against multiple prosecutions that surely is adequate to meet the
perceived needs of any state interest insufficiently attended to by a
previous prosecution. The only interests which cannot be served by
a prior prosecution in another state's courts are the desire to inflict
upon an individual the very multiple trials and punishments which
the double jeopardy clause was meant to bar, and the desire to be
the actual agent of punishment, an interest that we submit is entitled
to no consideration.
A more realistic approach to ascertaining state interests than
the definitional approach of the Court would have been for the
Court to examine the extent to which the states actually assert that
they have unique interests which cannot be satisfied by prior prose-
cution in another state. The research of the parties and the Court in
Heath revealed only a single prior case in which two states actually
prosecuted the same individual for the same offense based upon the
same acts."19 In contrast, at least forty states limit or bar criminal
prosecutions in their own courts where the prospective defendant
already has been prosecuted by another government. Eleven states
bar a second prosecution arising out of the same transaction; 20
117 Cf. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf" A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
118 The question of whether two crimes are the "same offense" is one of legislative
intent. As to federal criminal laws "the test to be applied to determine whether there
are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the
other does not .... Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977). Accord, Ohio v.Johnson,
104 S. Ct. 2536, 2541 n.8, reh'g denied, 105 S. Ct. 20 (1984); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S.
359, 366 (1983); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 337 (1981); Whalen v. United
States, 445 U.S. 684, 691 (1980); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932);
Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911); Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S.
365, 395 (1902). Cf Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980)(remand on whether failing to
reduce speed was lesser included offense of vehicular manslaughter in general or in
particular case). State criminal laws may be interpreted differently. Ohio v. Johnson, 104
S. Ct. at 2536; Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366; People v. Robideau, 419 Mich. 458, 355
N.W.2d 542 (1984). Cf infra note 132 (on ascertaining legislative intent).
119 See supra note 106.
120 See ALASKA STAT. § 12.20.010 (1962); CAL. PENAL CODE § 656 (West 1970); Id
§ 793 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 19-315 (1979); IND. CODE § 35-41-4-5 (1978); MoNT.
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eight states bar a second prosecution arising out of the same trans-
action unless it is for a different offense and serves a distinct societal
interest not served by the relevant criminal statute of the first gov-
ernment;12 ' and eight states bar a second prosecution for the same
offense.122 Forty states bar a second prosecution in the area of drug
offenses. 123
It may well be that many states bar such prosecutions as a mat-
ter of prosecutorial discretion, as does the federal government.' 24
Nonetheless, the rarity of such prosecutions, as well as the fact that a
majority of states actually have barred them, demonstrates the tenu-
ous nature of the claim that such prosecutions are necessary to vin-
dicate unique state interests. The laws and practices of the states
are an important measure of state interests and of what due process
requires.' 25 The Court's decision to ignore these laws and practices
and to find a state's claimed interests superior to those of an individ-
ual "by definition" is a sad commentary on the Court's conception
of rationality in decisionmaking. It is an even sadder commentary
on the Court's apparent view of the importance of what Western
civilization has perceived as a fundamental human right. The right
to be free from multiple prosecutions falls before the "definition" of
state interests where that definition is not informed by anything ex-
cept an expressed desire on the part of state authorities to prosecute
a particular individual.
CONST. art. I, § 25; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-504 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.070
(1986); State v. Hogg, 118 N.H. 262, 385 A.2d 844 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-03-13
(1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 130 (West 1969); VA. CODE § 19.2-294 (1983)(prior
federal prosecution); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.43.040 (1980).
121 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-108 (1977); Id. at § 43-1224.1; COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-
303 (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 209 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. 701-112 (1976);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 505.050 (1985); People v. Cooper, 398 Mich. 450, 247 N.W.2d 866
(1976); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1- 11 (1982)(prior federal prosecution, might permit for
greater offense in extreme cases; 218 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 111 (Purdon 1983); Com-
monwealth v. Mills, 447 Pa. 163, 286 A.2d 638 (1971).
122 See Criminal Code of 1961, § 3-4(c), ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 38, § 3-4(c)(Smith-Hurd
1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3108 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609-045 (1983); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-11-27 (1972); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20 (McKinney 1981 & Supp.
1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-134 (1983); State v. Batdorf, 293 N.C. 486, 238 S.E.2d
497 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-403 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.71 (West 1982).
123 See United States v. Jones, 527 F.2d 817, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(Wright, J., dissent-
ing); L. Miller, supra note 69 at 109 n.9. Most of these statutes refer to prior federal
prosecutions.
124 See supra note 78.
125 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S.
121, 140-49 (1959); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798, reh'g denied, 344 U.S. 848
(1952); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 21-23, reh'g denied, 339 U.S. 926 (1950).
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V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The approach that the Supreme Court had available to it was to
compare the demands of state law enforcement with the interests of
the individual. The Court could have evaluated the extent to which
the concerns that gave rise to the dual sovereignty doctrine are pres-
ent in the context of successive state prosecutions for the same of-
fense, and whether there are other considerations that arise in that
peculiar setting. Second, the Court could have examined the inter-
ests of the individual and how they relate to those of the state. The
issue in Heath should have been whether there was sufficient justifi-
cation to permit an exception to an important principle of human
rights. We offer here our analysis of this question, not because we
believe that the Court is likely to overrule Heath, but rather to
demonstrate that the analysis can be performed with little
difficulty. 12 6
In 1969, in Benton v. Maryland,127 the Supreme Court held that
the fifth amendment double jeopardy prohibition applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.' 28 Based upon its review
of the history of double jeopardy principles and the great number of
state laws barring double jeopardy, 129 the Court concluded that
126 The Court's rejection of a comparison of state and individual interests as "diffi-
cult," 106 S. Ct. at 439, is disingenuous at best. In Heath, the Court was not asked to
authorize or require a case-by-case interest analysis, but rather to compare the funda-
mental individual interests at stake in successive state prosecutions with whatever legiti-
mate state interests such prosecutions might serve to determine whether the dual
sovereignty exception should apply at all. Brief for Petitioner at 36-41, Heath. But see id.
at 41-42 (arguing in the alternative). The Court was not, in short, asked "to discard its
sovereignty analysis and to substitute in its stead [a] ... difficult and uncertain balancing
of interests approach." 106 S. Ct. at 439. Rather, the Supreme Court was asked to
make a rational inquiry into the interests secured by the double jeopardy prohibition
and the dual sovereignty exception and to compare them to the interests advanced by
the state of Alabama to justify expanding the scope of the dual sovereignty exception.
Such a comparison is not difficult to perform, and it requires the conclusion that in our
federal system of government there is no need to apply the dual sovereignty exception
to the double jeopardy prohibition to permit successive prosecutions by different states
of the same individual for the same offense.
127 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
128 Id. at 794.
129 The Court observed that the laws of all fifty states bar doublejeopardy. Id at 795.
However, the laws of the states are not uniform; rather they vary considerably in the
scope of protection provided. It remains true that the laws of all states independently
limit double jeopardy. Forty-one states provide basic double jeopardy bars in various
forms in their state constitutions. ALA. CONsT. art. I, § 9; ALAsKA CONsT. art. I, § 9;
Amiz. CONsT. art. 2, § 10; ARK. CONsT. art. 2, § 8. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 15; COLO. CONST.
art. II, § 18; DEL. CONsT. art. I, § 8; FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 9; GA. CONsT. art. I, § 1, para.
XVIII; HAWAii CoNsT. art. I, § 19; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10;
IND. CONST. art. I, § 14; KAN. CONsT. Bill of Rights § 10; Ky. CONST. Bill of Rights § 13;
LA. CONsT. art. I, § 15; MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 7; Miss. CONsT. art. 3, § 22; MONT. CONST.
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"[t]he fundamental nature of the guarantee against double jeopardy
can hardly be doubted."130 The Court recognized three fundamen-
tal principles underlying the prohibition of double jeopardy: (1) an
individual should not repeatedly be subjected to the "embarrass-
ment, expense and ordeal" of defending against a particular crimi-
nal charge; (2) an individual should not live "in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity" not knowing if he or she again will be prose-
cuted for the same offense; and (3) the state should not increase the
probability of conviction of the innocent by repeated prosecution of
the same charges.13' In other cases the Court also has recognized a
fourth principle underlying the double jeopardy prohibition: that
an individual should not undergo multiple punishments for the
same offense. 132
art. II, § 25; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 12; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15;
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 12; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10; OKLA. CONST.
art. 2, § 21; OR. CONST. art. I, § 12; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10; R.I. CONST. amend. XL, § 1;
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 12; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 10; TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 14; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9; W.
VA. CONST. art. 3, § 5; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 8; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 11. One state has
had its constitutional due process clause interpreted to bar double jeopardy. CONN.
CONST. art. I, § 8; Kohlfuss v. Warden, 149 Conn. 692, 183 A.2d 626, cert. denied, 371
U.S. 928 (1962). Four states bar a second prosecution after a former acquittal. IowA
CONsT. art. I, § 12; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 19; N.H. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 16; N.J. CONsT. art. I,
para. 11. The common law of the remaining four states bars double jeopardy. Gilpin v.
State, 142 Md. 464, 121 A. 354 (1923); Commonwealth v. Vanetzian, 350 Mass. 491,215
N.E.2d 658 (1966); State v. Clemons, 207 N.C. 276, 176 S.E. 760 (1934); State v.
O'Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 170 A. 98 (Vt. 1934).
130 Benton, 395 U.S. at 795.
131 Id. at 795-96.
132 See Ohio v.Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2536, 2540 (1984); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,
165 (1977); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). This principle is re-
lated to what has become known as due process "vindictiveness" analysis, which limits
the ability of the government to raise a defendant's punishment upon retrial or remand
in situations where a vindictive purpose, such as a desire to punish exercise of an appeal,
may be the motivation behind the harsher sanction. See Wasman v. United States, 104 S.
Ct. 3217 (1984); Thigpen v. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. 2916 (1984); United States v.
Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263 (1982); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368
(1982); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17
(1973); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
(1969). However, under certain circumstances the prosecution may be permitted to take
an appeal solely to increase the degree of a defendant's punishment. United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980). The limitation on multiple punishments is itself lim-
ited by the notion that the question of "whether punishments are 'multiple' is essentially
one of legislative intent." Ohio v.Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2535, 2541 (1984)(footnote omit-
ted). See also Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983). Thus, the principle also
functions to bar the infliction of multiple punishments for a single offense where the
legislature did not intend to authorize such. The Constitution does not prescribe or
require any particular method of ascertaining the purpose of a statute. The Supreme
Court has indicated that in the case of federal criminal law, it will be presumed absent
clear legislative intent to the contrary that Congress did not intend to authorize multiple
punishment for a single offense. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980); Cf
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From the perspective of the individual subjected to successive
prosecutions on the basis of the same allegation, it obviously mat-
ters little whether a second proceeding is brought in the courts of a
different state. A second prosecution by a different state impinges
just as directly upon the interests underlying the double jeopardy
prohibition as would successive prosecutions in the same state.
Such a prosecution by a second state results in an individual repeat-
edly being subjected to the ordeal of a trial on the same charges.
The possibility of successive prosecutions places an individual in a
continuing state of anxiety over the possibility of future prosecution
on the basis of the same allegations. The probability of convicting
an innocent defendant is increased by repeated trials of the same
charges, no matter which government brings the successive prose-
cutions. Finally, successive prosecutions by different states may re-
sult in an individual suffering multiple punishments for the same
acts. These concerns are magnified if multiple state prosecutions
are permissible. The Court's ruling in Heath places no limits on the
number of states which could claim the right to prosecute an indi-
vidual for the same act, despite the fact that most states have highly
similar criminal laws serving identical interests.
In contrast with the important interests of the individual in
avoiding multiple prosecutions and punishments, there is little to be
gained by allowing such prosecutions, and without important and
independent state interests at stake, there is no justification for ex-
tending the scope of the dual sovereignty exception to include suc-
cessive state prosecutions. We already have seen that the Court's
conclusion that states have distinct interests served by bringing their
own criminal prosecutions despite earlier proceedings in other
states is unjustified 33 and that the Court's postulate that such inter-
ests exist "by definition" is not compelling. The dual sovereignty
theory on the other hand is an impingement upon a basic individual
right, an impingement previously justified by the implications of the
fact that in the federal system of government the states share territo-
rial jurisdiction with the federal government. As the Court said in
Lanza, the first case in which the dual sovereignty theory was actually
applied to uphold a second prosecution:134 "We have here two sov-
ereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983)(regarding state statutes); People v. Robideau,
419 Mich. 458, 355 N.W.2d 592 (1984)(rejecting deviation from normal means of ascer-
taining legislative interest in double jeopardy questions).
133 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
134 See supra note 81.
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with the same subject matter within the same territory." 135 Simi-
larly, in a passage in Heath, the irony of which was apparently lost on
the opinion's author, the Court said that "To deny a State its power
to enforce its criminal laws because another State has won the race
to the courthouse 'would be a shocking and untoward deprivation of
the historic right and obligation of the States to maintain peace and
order within their confines.' "136 However, states do not share territo-
rial jurisdiction;13 7 thus the type of friction that may occur between
the federal and state government will occur considerably less fre-
quently, if at all, between states. There is only one other case that
we have found where two states tried an individual for the same of-
fense, which is powerful evidence that states do not come into con-
flict in the same manner as occurs with state and federal law
enforcement. Thus, the fundamental premise of the dual sover-
eignty exception is absent in the context of interstate relationships,
and consequently there is no reason to abandon the normal double
jeopardy constraint on multiple prosecutions.
To the extent that an extraordinary case may arise where suc-
cessive state prosecutions are warranted, it is not an undue burden
to require the state that desires to bring duplicative criminal pro-
ceedings to justify its position.1 38 The Court's concern about a "dif-
ficult balancing of interests approach" if performed case-by-case has
some merit in this context, but a state would not face insurmounta-
ble barriers in demonstrating a reason for repeated prosecution. If
there are unvindicated state interests at stake a state can articulate
them and the courts can judge their merits. Moreover, the possibil-
ity that significant state interests may in some unusual case be in
need of vindication does not justify creating an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that the state wanting to subject an individual to a second
(or third...) prosecution has interests superior to those of the indi-
vidual who may be subjected to successive prosecutions. Where a
state would seek to justify multiple prosecutions, the courts would
be faced with a decision no more difficult than ones they currently
perform successfully under state statutes forbidding multiple prose-
cutions in the absence of unvindicated state interests.1 39
135 U.S. v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
136 106 S. Ct. at 440, quoting Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 137 (emphasis added).
137 See infra note 144.
138 The Model Penal Code supports such an approach. The Code suggests that a
former prosecution in another jurisdiction should bar a second prosecution arising out
of the same conduct unless the second prosecution is not for the same offense and
serves a substantially different societal purpose. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.10 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962).
139 Courts have proven able to engage in such an inquiry. People v. Cooper, 398
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One potential criticism of our position is that because normal
double jeopardy principles generally bar a prosecution for a crime
after prosecution for a lesser included offense of that crime,' 40 a
second state often may have unvindicated interests in bringing its
own prosecution for a more serious crime which nevertheless is for
double jeopardy purposes the "same" offense as that earlier prose-
cuted. However, it is difficult to imagine why the states that are in-
volved in situations where this might occur would not cooperate and
permit the state with jurisdiction over the greater offense to prose-
cute first. 141 In any event, the solution to the problem of limited
jurisdiction, assuming one is needed, is to develop and apply a "ju-
risdictional exception" to double jeopardy that permits a separate
jurisdiction to try an individual for an offense where the individual
already has been prosecuted for a lesser included offense in a court
lacking jurisdiction of the greater offense. 142
VI. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF HEATH
What may be the most unfortunate result of the decision in
Heath is its unintended consequences. There are only a few exam-
Mich. 450, 460-61, 247 N.W.2d 866, 870-71 (1976); Commonwealth v. Mills, 447 Pa.
163, 171-74, 286 A.2d 638, 641-43 (1971)(noting that guidelines on this question have
been promulgated by the American Law Institute and by the National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws). See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 397 So. 2d 715, 718-19
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 627-28, 373 A.2d 90,
102 (1977). See also Turley v. Wyrick, 554 F.2d 840, 843-44 (8th Cir. 1977) (Lay, J.,
concurring) (supporting an interest test).
140 Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 421 (1980); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
Prosecution of a lesser included offense does not bar later prosecution of the greater
crime if the defendant requested or consented to severance of the charges, Jeffers v.
United States, 432 U.S. 137, 152-54 (1977), or if all the events necessary for the greater
crime had not occurred when the prosecution for the lesser was begun. Id at 151-52.
An equally divided Court upheld a decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico hold-
ing that prosecution of a lesser included offense in a court of limited jurisdiction which
has no jurisdiction over a greater offense does not bar later prosecution of that greater
crime in a court of general criminal jurisdiction. New Mexico v. Fugate, 101 N.M. 58,
678 P.2d 686 (N.M. 1984), aff'd mem., 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985)(equally divided Court with
Justice Powell not taking part in the decision).
141 See infra notes 105-11 and accompanying text. This was certainly not a problem in
Heath. Mr. Heath was placed in jeopardy for his life for murder in Georgia, 106 S. Ct. at
435, received a sentence of life imprisonment and then was placed once more in jeop-
ardy of his life for the same murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 435-36. The fact that
Mr. Heath was twice placed in jeopardy of his life for the same crime is a unique circum-
stance calling for rejection of the application of the dual sovereignty theory to this case.
See infra note 145. The Court has ruled in the context of prosecution by a single sover-
eign that a defendant can be "acquitted" of the death penalty. Arizona v. Rumsey, 104
S. Ct. 2305 (1984); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981). If the proceedings in
Georgia "acquitted" Mr. Heath of the death penalty, then only prosecution by a differ-
ent "sovereign" permitted him to be sentenced to death.
142 This may be the law even as to a single jurisdiction. See supra note 140.
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ples in the history of the United States where a state has attempted
to try someone for a murder committed in another state.143 The
reason for this state of affairs is obvious: the states generally have
viewed the scope of their criminal jurisdiction as limited by notions
of territoriality and territorial effect. 144
Thus, the accepted wisdom prior to Heath seems to have been
that a murder is to be tried where it occurs. In addition, notwith-
standing the Court's curious suggestion to the contrary,
prosecutorial offices are overworked. Rather than being in competi-
tion with each other, their normal reaction is to quite cheerfully let
some other office prosecute for an offense if that other office is so
inclined. This normal mode of doing business is not likely to be
changed by Heath.
The normal mode of doing business will be changed, however,
in the abnormal case. Prosecutors will take advantage of the powers
extended to them in Heath in the unusual case. It takes little imagi-
nation to foresee what those cases will be. They will, first of all, be
143 See Lane v. State, 388 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 1980)(Florida had jurisdiction over murder
because essential elements of crime could be established beyond reasonable doubt in
state even though fatal blow and victim's death occurred in Alabama, but conviction set
aside on incompetency grounds); People v. Holt, 91 Ill. 2d 480, 440 N.E.2d 103
(1983)(Illinois had no jurisdiction over felony murder where kidnapping occurred in
Illinois, but killing subsequently was planned and committed in Wisconsin); Pollard v.
State, 270 Ind. 599, 388 N.E.2d 496 (1979)(assault by stabbing in Indiana followed by
abdjuction to Kentucky where the fatal gunshot wound was inflicted was adequate juris-
dictional basis for Indiana murder conviction where crime involved "one continuous
plan"); Conrad v. State, 262 Ind. 446, 317 N.E.2d 789 (1974)(kidnapping and man-
slaughter convictions upheld where killing occurred on "State Line Road" between In-
diana and Ohio). But see Pruett v. Mississippi, 431 So. 2d 1101 (Miss. 1983). None of
these cases involved prosecution by a second state.
144 "The common law considers crimes as altogether local, and cognizable and pun-
ishable exclusively in the country, where they are committed." J. STORY, CONFLICT OF
LAws 516 (1834). At common law every crime had only one "situs" or "locus" which
determined the place of commission for jurisdictional purposes. Levitt,Jurisdiction Over
Crime, 16J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 316, 324-25 (1925); Perkins, The Territorial Principle
in Criminal Law, 22 HASTINGS LJ. 1155, 1157 (1971); Comment,Jurisdiction over Interstate
Felony Murder, 50 U. CH. L. RIv. 1431, 1434 (1983). It generally is accepted that juris-
diction over a crime resides solely in the courts of the state where the crime was commit-
ted, that the laws of each state exclusively govern the nature of the offense, and that
states cannot exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed outside their borders. Hunt-
ington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892). Accord, R. ANDERSON, 4 WIiARTON'S CRIMINAL
LAW AND PRACTICE § 1501 (1957); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822-23 (1975); The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825); Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch.) 116, 136 (1812); Commonwealth v. Carroll, 360 Mass. 580, 584, 276 N.E.2d
705, 709 (1971); State v. Karsten, 194 Neb. 227, 229, 231 N.W.2d 335, 336 (1975); State
v. Luv Pharmacy, 118 N.H. 398, 405, 388 A.2d 190, 195 (1978); State v. Huginski, 139
Vt. 95, 97-98, 422 A.2d 935, 937 (1980). See also supra note 65 (noting that the impossi-




ones of great public interest where there is political advantage in
prosecuting. Thus, the first unintended effect of Heath will be to
subject an individual's interest in being free from vexatious litiga-
tion to individual prosecutors' desires for political advancement.
Many of those noteworthy cases are likely to be death penalty cases.
Therefore, the second unanticipated consequence of Heath will be
an increase in the number of capital cases brought; that in turn
surely will lead to an increase in the number of executions.
It is this last point that is the most troubling of all. Whatever
one's views of the propriety of capital punishment, if it is to be im-
posed it should be imposed only with the utmost respect for proce-
dural fairness. The Supreme Court now has structured a process in
which if one state does not succeed in executing an individual, an-
other state can try. And if that state does not succeed, still another
can try. That is a cruel mockery of the ideals cherished by our civili-
zation. At least we hope that it is. 14 5
145 In Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958), the Court in a per curiam opinion upheld
by a 5-4 vote an Illinois conviction and death sentence where the defendant allegedly
had killed his wife and three children. He was prosecuted for one death at a trial where
evidence of all four killings was introduced, was convicted, and received a twenty year
sentence. At a second trial for another death with similar evidence, he received a 45
year sentence. Finally, at a third such trial, he received the death penalty. Justices
Harlan and Frankfurther, two of the majority, suggested that if the state's motive was to
prosecute until it got a death sentence, that might constitute a violation of due process.
Id at 573. Justice Douglas dissented, speaking for Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Brennan, on the basis that the repeated prosecutions violated due process. Id at 575.
Alabama had no reason to prosecute Mr. Heath except to seek to raise his punishment
from life in prison to death.
1985] 831
